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ABSTRACT
Four years ago* the President of the United States 
announced the introduction of the Planning Programming 
Budgeting System (PPBS) budgeting to the entire Federal 
Government. By using this method * the President hoped, 
Federal administrators would be able to consider the costs, 
impacts and benefits of alternative programs simultaneously, 
and in doing so, make ’’more rational resource allocation.
This essay is a study of the application of the technique 
to the operations of the Office of Economic Opportunity (0E0)»
The study focuses on the operation of the 0E0 
Management Information System (MIS), a device used to re­
port the ’’results” of 0E0 disbursements, for if one is un­
able to determine what progress has been made in the 
achievement of objectives, how can he plan intelligently?
Evidence suggests that personnel skills and attitudes 
combine to seriously hinder the application of MIS reporting 
to 0E0 operations. Moreover, the information produced by 
MIS gives no indication of the achievement of the broad 
economic goals for which the agency was authorized by 
Congress. Finally, there are political” pressures that 
serve to make the development of a rational plan of ex­
penditure impossible. One could say that 0E0 planners make 
plans, only to be forced to abandon them.
The history of accomplishments of this agency, com­
bined with evidence of the unsuccessful application of MIS 
reporting techniques to its activities, suggests that the 
chief value of applying PPBS to this sort of operation is 
that it compels us to think about how best to accomplish the 
objectives of a program that we, as citizens have authorized 
and consider morally worthy of our best efforts.
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AT THE MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM AT THE OEF 
OP ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY: THE PLANNING, 
PROGRAMMING BUDGETING SYSTEM AS IT 
APPLIES TO A HUMAN RESOURCE 
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM
FOREWORD
In early England, the word ""budget1 was used to 
denote the "bag In which the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
carried his proposals for public expenditures to Parlia­
ment . It was a statement of public goals. Our modern 
budget-formulation process has become a device for 
specifying the products of public disbursements. This 
implies that the government seeks to meet objectives, and 
that it has a system with which it -can measure its effec­
tiveness in attaining them. To relate spending to the 
purposes for which our government exists is the task 
Assigned to the Planning Programming Budgeting System 
(PPBS) • To study the feasibility of using this technique 
.for planning and evaluating expenditures is the purpose of 
this essay.
In the past we have measured the results of govern­
ment spending in terms of the dollar amounts of money in­
vested in salaries, buildings and fixtures, while wishing 
that we could do more to specify the "end products" of 
expenditures. This approach is grounded in the notion 
that the sole way we have to limit the size of government 
is to limit its resources, financial and physical.
Wot until 1961, when PPBS was introduced at the
1
Department of Defense, was there concern with an analysis 
of what our dollars had purchased, in 'this case in terms 
of a stable and effective national security. Robert S. 
McNamara and his assistants used PPBS techniques in de­
fense planning simple mathematical and economic theories 
to national security questions. Moreover, they divided 
the broad area of "national defense" into nine areas, such 
as "continental air defense," into which all of the serv­
ices would contribute men and material resources.
Central to these efforts has been the computation 
of what has become known as "cost-effectiveness." That is: 
one asks whether the benefits of a particular venture out­
weigh its costs, realizing of course that there are ele­
ments of every decision that cannot be quantified. In ex­
plaining this technique to a group of naval officers,
Alain Enthovain, a chief McNamara assistant, referred to th 
decision to make the aircraft carrier TJS3 John P. Kennedy 
fossil-fueled rather than nuclear-powered„ He pointed out 
that naval officers would argue on largely instinctive 
grounds that nuclear power is far superior to conventional 
power. The cost analyst endeavors, however, to ask the
questions essential to the proper decision: (1) how much
*)
better and, (2) why?
**Alain Enthovain, "Systems Analysis and the Navy," 
in Planning: Programming Budgeting:: A Systems Approach to
The cost analyst argu.es that in a world of limited 
resources, 400 million dollars will buy one nuclear carrier 
or one carrier and four destroyers conventionally-fueled.
The public servant is obligated by the enormity of the re­
sources involved to quantify, as far as he is able, the 
grounds for his decision, and at the Department of Defense 
cost effectiveness studies have been heavily relied upon 
as bases for judgements on whether to engage in procurement 
of many items o
The Federal Government, in 1964, made a commitment 
in many respects as important as its obligation to defend , 
the country from foreign enemies; namely to eliminate 
poverty In America* It did so by passage of the Economic 
Opportunity Act of 1964, which established the Office of 
Economic Opportunity (0E0). This is a locally-based,
.largely federally-financed'social service agency. It was 
to act through a series of Community Action Agencies (CAAs), 
each of which would have centers to which poor people could 
take their problems for solution. These solutions could 
vary from asking municipal agencies for help to calling 
upon Washington to establish pre-packaged programs in the
Management ed. by Fremont Lyden and E. G. Miller (Chicago: 
Markham Co., 1967), pp. 267-280. "Therefore it is important 
to know whether by 'major increase in effectiveness1 is 
meant more than. 33 percent, about 35 percent, or less than 
33 percent. Because the Secretary of Defense must make the 
decision in these terms, the statement ’major increase1 is 
not helpful.n
areas concerned. The dual articles of belief upon which 
the program was based were that people, given the opportu­
nity to do so, would "pitch in" to help their less fortu­
nate fellow citizens and that poor people could specify 
their needs accurately. Thus, the CAA was to be a 
"lightning rod" to which community problems and the re­
sources to resolve them would be simultaneously attracted.
Today, nearly four years after its founding, 0E0 is 
a center of controversy, even though it has used PPBS in 
planning and executing the War on Poverty. We live in a 
society that prides itself on the efficient and visibly 
effective solution of its problems. But, in the war on 
poverty, we have undertaken a program in which the needs of 
the beneficiaries are varied and the "results" of our efforts 
hard to demonstrate. 0E0 has been required to include 
prospective beneficiaries in its programs, and thus has been 
assigned a task that is not only difficult to execute, but 
one in which the virtues of "efficiency and honesty" are 
often, of necessity, lacking.
0E0 has tried to counter these problems by using a 
management information system (MJS), a device developed 
after the agency had been in existence nearly three years, 
to determine who is being helped by its operations. MIS 
requires that each CAA report quarterly the number of its 
participants, their ethnic and Income characteristics, and 
to specify the results of CAA operations. But It has been
difficult to secure accurate data with MIS, both because 
of the clerical inefficiency of the units reporting, and 
because of the inherent difficulties in monitoring social 
change. In the end, despite its reliance on cost-benefit 
analysis and the management information system, the 0E0 
budget 1ms been an act of faith. This leads to the major 
premise implicit in this essay: that we must be willing
to accept a less-rigorous proof of results, and at the 
same time, continue to seek more effective ways to meet 
the as yet unfulfilled challenge of the Economic Opportu­
nity Act of 1964.
The essay which follows rests on a survey of 0E0 
management literature, numerous articles on public budget­
ing ,and management, and interviews with men who work at 
all,levels of 0E0-neighborhood center, local CAA, Regional 
Offine, and National Headquarters, and it draws examples 
from the CAA established In Richmond, Virginia, in 1965.? 
RCAP. It proceeds in five sections. Chapter One argues 
that citizens have in fact become more interested in the 
end products of public disbursements, while Chapter Two 
Indicates that 0E0 has adopted a systematic approach to 
planning and evaluating Its activities. The MIS, supposed­
ly a way of demonstrating the results of activities so that 
future activities can be planned, is the subject of 
Chapter Three, while in Chapter Pour the operational 
difficulties of OEO!s M S  are spelled out. In Chapter Five,
6the nature of the political milieu in which 0E0 must seek 
Its funds and Its effects on OEOfs program budgeting is 
discussed at length.
CHAPTER I
FEDERAL BUDGETING— A QUICK OVERVIEW
In August, 1.965* the President directed that the 
Planning Programming Budgeting System (PPBS) he instituted 
throughout the Federal government. ^ He directed that the 
installation he supervised hy the Bureau of the Budget 
(BOB). His turning to this system was the result of end­
less struggles during the budget formulation process. What 
are, we going to do, how are we going to do it, how much of 
it .are we going to do, and what will our efforts produce? 
These are the perennial questions and the man who must 
ultimately answer is the President. The function of PPBS 
is to aid him to making these decisions; with its aid, 
Bureau leaders and Department heads can give the President 
alternative courses of action for consideration. With the 
aid of this tool, they can focus their attention on the 
country's goals and how to attain them most effectively 
and efficiently.
1U.S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on National 
Security and International Operations of the Government 
Operations Committee, P1 arming Programming Budgeting;♦ 
initial Memorandum, Committee Print, 90th Cong., 1st sess., 
1967* P* 1.
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What is PPBS? This is a question that has plagued 
the citizen and caused concern within the Executive Branch 
at the operating level* On-the-site managers have conjured 
up sinister pictures of the Bureau leader who constructs 
models, turns to a computer and works a mathematical 
formula to determine how much aid a given program will re­
ceive in the forthcoming year* This skepticism has been 
best characterized by the statements of Vice Admiral Hyman 
Rickover, the father of the atomic-powered submarine* 
Criticizing PPBS and the cost-effectiveness studies upon 
which it is based, he declared,
* . . I have no more faith in the ability of social 
scientists to quantify military effectiveness than 1 
do in the numerologists to calculate the future *2
So it goes* The operating managers accuse the Department
heads of lack of contact with their problems, and the
PPBSers reply that their system is meant to be an aid to
decision making, not a decision maker* PPBS stresses four
features: (l) Identification of governmental goals, (2)
establishment of priorities in meeting these goals, (5)
choice of goal-seeking behavior with the least cost in
future years in mind, and (t) measurement of goal-directed
performance, so that one gets the maximum yield for each
^U.S*, Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on National 
Security and International Operations of the Government 
Operations Committee, Selected Comment, Planning; Pro­
gramming Budgeting, Committee Print, 90th Cong*, 1st sess.,
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dollar disbursed." To see PPBS in its true perspective, 
let us look at the budge t -making process as it op) era ted. in 
Washington not too many years ago.
The current budget formulation process, in which the 
Executive Branch takes the initiative in proposing and the 
Legislative Branch in disposing, was developed as a result 
of the enactment of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921® 
Prior to that time, there had been only sporadic interest 
in executive budgeting. Alexander Hamilton, as President 
Washington’s first Secretary of the Treasury, had attempted 
to institute "executive budgeting." He did this by pre­
paring a detailed summary of expenses and revenues and 
presenting it to the Congress, until the development of 
committees prevented this practice. A Presidential commis­
sion, appointed by Mr, Taft in 1910, recommended the sub­
mission of an "executive" budget for fiscal year 1915®
Taft submitted his budget according to the format of the 
commission proposal, which consisted of having Department 
heads submit to him detailed accounts of the obligations 
they intended to incur for the period under consideration. 
However, this plan was frustrated by the fact that Taft had
been defeated in the elections and was succeeded by Woodrow
4Wilson, who did not want to undertake budgetary reforms.
^Ibid., p. 1.
Jesse Burkhead, Governmental Budgeting (New York, 
N.Y.: Wiley and Sons, I9S2), pp. 9~l8._
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These initial attempts to establish, executive 
responsibility for planning a program of work for the 
government proved abortive until 1921. Until that time, 
ail individual agency dealt with a friendly legislative 
committee on Capitol Hill. The Treasury merely put to­
gether agency estimates in its annual 1 Bo ok of Estimates.1
The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 was explicit 
in the duties it set for each of the branches of govern­
ment. To the President went the responsibility for sub­
mitting to Congress annually a statement of proposed 
revenues and expenditures for the ensuing year. To a new 
Bureau of the Budget (BOB), it assigned the task of 
examining the agency requests for funding for the coming 
years. The Bureau’s recommendation on a particular fund­
ing level could be appealed only to the President. This 
provision has partially served to reduce the dealings be­
tween the Department head and the Legislative Committees.
It has not been wholly successful because legislators often 
can ask friendly questions of Bureau leaders who testify 
in hearings in which appropriations are involved.
Placement and coverage of the Bureau of the Budget 
'at first proved troublesome. Until 1999> BOB was attached 
to the Department of the Treasury. At that time, it was■ 
brought into the Executive Office of the President, an 
entity created by President Franklin Roosevelt’s Executive 
Reorganization Act. This change was part of a new orienta-
11
tlon to the President* s duties that derived from the in­
creasing complexity of government and the burgeoning number 
of its programs*
BOB*s powers are great. No federal form requesting 
information of any character for use in government opera- 
tions may legally be used without its approval. All 
government statistics collecting agencies have their 
activities monitored by the Bureau, while all computer pro­
curement is handled by this agency* All legislation passed 
by Congress is sent to BOB to determine whether or not it 
is relevant to the President’s program as expressed by the 
executive budget. When the particular appropriations 
measures are signed into law by the President, the Depart­
ment head must come to BOB for an apportionment in order to 
spend. Even at this time, the President has, on BOB 
recommenda11on, set up budgetary reserves in order to curb 
agency spending.
The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, establishing 
as it did mechanisms for making the budget -making process 
an expression of the President’s thoughts on what the work 
program of the Federal Government should be, was an innova­
tion. Legislators have grown so accustomed to discussion 
and alteration of this work agenda that they have complained 
when a President placed the responsibility for developing
^Ibid*, p. 259.
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6a program on them.
There is tension between the Executive and the
Leg.isl8.tive Branches of the Federal Government, and we can
see it in the construction of the Federal Budget* In the
years immediately following the passage of the Budget and
Accounting Act of 1921, appropriations for various ventures
were made by what has become known as the 1 line item1
method. That is, a project was funded in terms of x
number of typewriters or y number of automobiles, and
money could be expended only for the purposes set forth in
the line item. This practice developed because legislators
felt that the only way to curb executive expenditures and
burgeoning programs was to establish a limit on the re-
7.sources that could be devoted to a program.' This method 
gives no consideration to what the basic goals of 
organized government are to be. The "line item" or "Dawes" 
orientation (as it was named after the first BOB Director 
Charles Dawes), prevailed until the early thirties, when 
the first attempts at “performance” budgeting were made.
“Performance" budgeting is a generic name given to 
types of display of governmental expenditure in which pro­
grams are described in terms of the goals to be attained by
^"Can The 1958 Federal Budget be Substantially 
Reduced?", Congressional Digest, May, 19575 Vol. XXXVI, 
p. 146. .
7‘Burkhead, Budgeting, p. 140.
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the expenditure of resources. An early example of the 
performance techniques is shown in the 1915 report of the 
hew York Bureau of Municipal Research. That group, 
dividing public works functions, devised three classifica­
tions of work: street cleaning, street maintenance, and
sewerage. They further divided these classifications into 
1 sub functions0 and as a final touch, developed '’units of 
work," such as "miles of streets flushed." Appropriations 
were based on the number of these units of work, though 
the system became so cumbersome that it had to be 
abandoned. ®
The Taft Committee on Economy and Efficiency, in 
its«1912 report, stressed the importance of classifying 
expenditures in terms of the class of work to be done.
This• was the same report that convinced Mr. Taft that 
Presidential direction of the budget-making process was 
required. Little was done to implement the performance 
budget concept during the inter-war years. The only 
Federal agencies developing performance schemes were the 
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) and the Department of 
Agriculture.
TVA was established to be a yardstick for the 
measurement of the cost of power production. It was orga,- 
nized as a government corporation and enjoyed considerable
8Ibid.. p. 155.
autonomy in the development of its management practices.
Its operations were divided into four ’’programs:1 Naviga­
tion and Flood Control, Fertilizer and Munitions, Resources 
and Development, and General Services. Each of these 
’’programs” was further subdivided into sub-pro grams „ For 
example. Resource Development is divided into divisions 
for the development of Agricultural, Forest, Watershed 
resources and Topographic Mapping. Though these sub­
programs are professionally organized, they participate in 
each other’s work when the programs overlap.
Departments of TVA are encouraged to think; in terms of, 
program and to participate jointly in program formula­
tion. . . The approach keeps management focussed on 
TVA objectives. . . .9,
Within each program, there may be a number of orga­
nizational entities to carry out the work of the program. 
Each has an account to which funds are devoted for operation 
TVA has emphasized the comparison of actual costs with the 
money allocated for the operations of its divisions, though 
in some cases it has measured the end products of its in­
vestment, as in fertilizer production.
Had it not been for the Second World 'War, there might 
have been no further interest in budgeting. However, it 
demonstrated that the government had grown too large to be 
operated under the "Dawes” orientation. The beginnings of
15
change in the form and substance of budgeting may be ob­
served in the proposed expenditures submitted to Congress, 
by the Navy in 19^7 and 19*1-8.
These budgets display, among other things, the 
amounts of money to be disbursed for the operation of the 
United States Naval Academy* There is a detailed account 
of the number and level of instructors to be hired, in­
cluding the stricture that there shall be no more than 
fourteen swordsmen for instructional purposes on the staff
i n
at Annapolis* Following this detailed account, there is 
a breakdown of how the $1,980,000 is to be distributed in i 
terms of functional areas such as Seamanship and Ordnance, 
each of which has a vital role to play in the education of 
capable Naval Officers. This sort of presentation repre­
sents a grow:Lng tendency to be concerned with "what1 dis­
bursements have purchased, while simultaneously showing the 
need for specification of precisely what articles the 
money has procured.
This interest in the end result of appropriations 
was felt beyond the Navy, and it influenced the Hoover
Commission, a group that had, been convened to study the
11operations of the Federal Government. This group met in 
10U.S., Bureau of the Budget, The Budget, 1918 
(Washington, B.C.: Government Printing Office, 19477,
p. 69*
11' Burkhead, Budgeting, p. 13^ •
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a year in which the BOB and the Department of the Treasury 
were engaged in the discussion of management improvement.
In this context of change, the Hoover Commission re­
ported that,
The whole budgetary concept of the Federal Government 
would be refashioned by the adoption of a budget based 
on functions activities and projects: This we de­
signate a performance budget.12
The task force went on to say that the emphasis of govern-
raent should no longer be on Mthings bought,” but rather
that it should focus on ”things done.” This, too, was the
basic thrust of the National Security Act of 19^9 Amend-
I
ments which stipulated that, - —
. . .  authorized programs shall be administered in such 
a form as the Secretary of Defense may determine. . . 
to report the cost of readily identifiable functional 
programs * . . *-5
■The Budget and Accounting Act of 1950 carried the idea even
further, requiring that the Budget set forth in such detail
as the President sees fit, the ”functions and activities”
of government *
The new emphasis on thinking about the Budget and
its preparation in terms of "projects” or "functions” has,
in fact, continued and reached a high watermark under the
leadership of Robert S. McNamara, the Defense Secretary
appointed by President John F. Kennedy. He and his Comp-
12Ibld.. p. 155.
1hbid.
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trolley Charles J, Hitch, conceived of the problem of 
“national security” in terms of nine areas: Strategic
Retaliatory Forces, Continental Air and Missile Defense, 
General Purpose Forces, Airlift and Sealift Forces,
Reserve and National Guard Forces, Research and Develop­
ment, General Support, and Civil Defense and Military 
Assistance. These areas are unique, since they do not 
describe the defense problem in terms of forces providing, 
such as the Army or the Navy; they describe the defense in
T li
terns of what has been provided (Table l).
TABLE 1
SHIFT IN MILITARY RESOURCE ALLOCATION8,
Old Budget Itystem " ~ NeW^Pranning Budgeting System
Strategic Forces
Polaris 
ICBM1s
Long range bombers
General Purpose Forces 
Marine Corps 
Armored divisions 
Tactical aircraft 
Carrier task forces
Continental Defense Forces 
Air defense aircraft 
Air defense missiles
'Extracted from Murray L, Weidenbaum, nApplying Econo­
mic Analyses” in Planning Programming Budgeting, ed. by Fre­
mont Lyden and E.G* Miller (Chicago: Markham,'1967), p„ 168.
lii
? Alain C. Enthovain, Economic Analyses and Defense 
Policy,1 in American Security Policy, ed* by Morton Berkowitz 
and P.F. Block (New York, N.Y.: Free Press, 1965),
pp., 150-52.
Navy 
P olaris 
Marine Corps 
-Carrier task forces
Air Force
i c m !s
Tactical aircraft 
Air Defense aircraft 
Long range bombers
Army
Air defense missiles 
Armored divisions
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Basic to this description is the program element, in which 
the combination of men and material resources necessary to 
carry out the goal of the program is set forth.
PPBS* at Defense stresses the importance of using 
mathematical and economic theories in the consideration of 
national security questions. For example, assume that the 
goal of a missile defense system is to shoot down 97 percent 
of the 100 missiles launched at this country by an aggressor. 
Let us also assume that the missile system under considera­
tion has a 50 percent chance of destroying the enemy's 
missile on the first shot. Simple mathematics suggests that 
200 missiles will be required to carry out the defensive 
goal. The question then arises about the level of cost to 
be involved in providing higher protection. How much, for
example, would it cost to provide a 99 percent destruction,
IBand would the cost be worth the destruction?  ^ Estimates 
of what it will cost to add the extra 2 percent capability 
are presented so that a decision-maker can reach a norma­
tive judgment about whether the extra destruction justifies 
the cost. Thus, there are two questions in any defense 
decision, the professional and the political. The pro­
fessional relates to the efficacy of the system under 
consideration and the politics,! to the level of funds which 
can be devoted to it.
I 5ITxLa.
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PP.BB approach is based on an overall look at De­
fense Department requirements rather than at the often 
partisan wishes of one service. Moreover, the expanded 
planning period of five years forces the planners to con™ 
sider the long-range cost implications of the decision.
In announcing the decision not to purchase another wing 
of B&2 bombers, the Secretary of Defense reflected that the 
procurement cost of one-half billion dollars was only about
one-third of the cost of operating the aircraft over a
16period of five years set forth in PPBS.
PPBS has cut across service lines. In a program the 
Navy and the Air Force may be required to contribute ele­
ments of men and material, and the civilian Secretary of
Defense will make the decision about what proportion of
17goods and services each will contribute. ‘ In only one 
program element is any service not forced to work with the 
others, and this Is Anti-Submarine Warfare, controlled 
solely by the Navy.
There have been faults with the PPBS approach at 
Defense, and these have occurred with relatively spectacular 
procurement items, such as the TFX fighter plane and the 
non-nuclear powered USS John F. Kennedy, thus making PPBS
l6Ibid.
17~1 There Is controversy on this point. For example, 
one year after deciding that USS John F. Kennedy was to be 
fossil fueled, the Defense Department went ahead with plans 
for a nuclear powered USS Chester W. Nlmitz.
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vulnerable to its critics, This raises the issue of un­
certainty and how one is to deal with it. At Defense, 
stress has been placed on developing estimates of a situa­
tion that range from optimistic to discouraging. The 
decision to make John F. Kennedy fossil-fueled was 
partially based on a study that purported to show that 
over the course of the attack carrier’s mission, there 
would be a speed advantage of only one knot. Moreover, the 
Kennedy would still require rearming and replenishment«
Citation of these PPBS failures and successes serves 
to show that use of this tool has put decision making 
clearly into the hands of the civilian Secretary of Defense, 
Furthermore, it has served to reduce the competitive 
Interaction among the services as they address themselves 
to the vital goal of national defense.
The critical difficulty with PPBS at Defense is that 
there is no way to test the results of how effective plan­
ning has been, short of war. This has led men like Admiral 
RIckover to question the assumptions on which decision­
makers have made the allocation of scarce resources. In 
particular, the Admiral questions the assumption that our 
sources of oil will always be secure, a critical premise in 
the decision to build ships conventionally-fueled,"^ His 
skepticism becomes important when he, as America’s foremost
Selected C omment, p. 37 •
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expert on nuclear power, testifies against an adversary 
like the Secretary of Defense.
The outline that has been given serves to show how 
PPBS is used in an obvious governmental function* namely 
defense* and implicitly points to some of the difficulties 
encountered in the attempt to apply PPBS to national 
social resource development.
The 0E0 does operate on the premise that there is a 
planning cycle in which appropriate national and local 
bodies can identify goals* establish priorities among 
those goals* devise programs to meet palpable needs* and 
evaluate the success or failure of ongoing programs to 
determine whether a given venture should be continued or 
abandoned. However, there are serious difficulties that 
hinder the implementation of this innovative tool.
First, there is the requirement for highly educated, 
and dedicated individuals to operate the PPBS information 
collection devices. This conflicts directly with the 0E0 
philosophy that there should be "maximum feasible participa­
tion" by the poor. Furthermore, there is serious question 
about how reliable the assessment of any human resource 
development program can be, since at 0E0, as in all pro­
grams , the results are "long run" in character. Moreover, 
goals such as "organization" of the poor are wholly unre­
lated to any broad economic goals. Finally, and possibly 
most important, 0E0 is a one billion dollar agency in a
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plethora of Departments and Agencies whose "poverty” budget 
aggregates twenty-eight billion dollars, and as 0E0 
officials are quick to admit, BOB has never given it the 
authority to plan expenditures other than its own. These 
are but the most prominent of the issues that will be con­
sidered in the ensuing chapters of this discussion.
CHAPTER II
CEO FUNCTIONS AND PPBS ORGANIZATION
Until about the middle of the decade of the sixties,
relatively little had been done to plan a systematic attack
against poverty. By this, we should understand an effort
with well defined goals and tools with which to measure
1progress in attaining them. The Johnson administration de­
clared 1 war1 on poverty in the early Fall of 196A, shortly 
before the introduction of the earlier mentioned PPBS budget- 
ing- techniques to the non-defense, federal spending agencies. 
The,., President declared that the agency to make anti-poverty 
plans operational would be the Office of Economic Opportu­
nity, within the Executive Office of the President.
Prior to discussing the 0E0 adaptation of PPBS to its 
spending activities, one must consider the responsibilities 
assigned to this agency, and the institutions that have been 
developed for meeting its tasks. Essentially, the Office of- 
Economic Opportunity is a social-service organization created
1 »‘Robert A. Levine, "Systems Analysis in the War on 
Poverty, " (Unpublished speech to the 29th meeting of the 
Operations Research Society of America, May 18, 1966), 
pp. 2-9.
25
24
to implement locally-drawn plans of action in the War on
' 2 Poverty with a combination of Federal and local resources.
The organization was conceived in this fashion for 
a number of reasons. Some individuals felt that the exist­
ing welfare programs are designed to ”buy off” the poor, and 
over the course of the past few years there ha,s developed 
the theory that those who live with the outward manifesta­
tions of poverty know how to combat it best. Finally,
critics have suggested that earlier programs discriminated
*5
against the colored man.
As mentioned earlier, the institutional form chosen 
for .the execution of the war1s operational plans was an 
independent office in the Executive Office of the President. 
Some have felt that this gives the poor a permanent agency 
to make their concerns known at the national level in addi­
tion- to meeting some of the criticisms made of earlier
pInstitute of Government, University of Virginia, 
Community Action Agencies in Virginia (Charlottesville, 
Virginia: December, l95B7T~P» 1. In this connection, one 
must distinguish between cash and in-kind support. The 
former Is what its title suggests. The latter consists of 
contributions of heat, light, etc. In the 31 cities for 
which information is available, the non-Federal share of 
support of Community Action Agencies was 26 million dollars. 
Of this total, local communities provided 3 million dollars 
in cash support.. See. also U.S. Congress, House of Repre- ‘ 
sentatives, Department of-Labor and Health Education and 
Welfare Appropriations for 1969. Hearings before a Sub­
committee of the House Appropriations Committee, House of 
Representatives, 90th Cong., 2nd sess., 1968, p. 43.
^Michael Harrington, The Other America (Baltimore: 
Penguin Books, 1963), p. 156.
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programs. The agency is composed of a National Head­
quarters and seven Regional Offices, and it employs about 
2800 civil-service employees at these levels. These 
employees serve to perform, the vital functions that are 
designated National Advocacy and Local Oversight.
National Advocacy refers to the submission to 
Congress of a National plan for fighting poverty. It is 
presented to the Legislative Branch in the form of the 
Budget, for which enabling appropriations legislation must 
be parsed. The annual process is a two-stage endeavor.
The Director of 0E0 must be able to tell the Bureau of the 
(Budget ,fwhyn a particular venture is cost effective, and 
moreover, he must be able to respond to the often hostile 
.questions of Congressmen on the Appropriations Committee.
The agency must also provide supervision and ”local 
oversight” to local CAAs. It needs detailed Information 
with which to make broad anti-poverty plans, and it must be 
able to respond to requests for detailed Information. To 
illustrate the dual nature of the 0E0 management problem, 
one might refer to the hearings held concerning the Fiscal 
1969 0E0 appropriations. There was considerable attention 
given to the Job Corps proposals. Questions focussed on 
providing for the ultimate employment of these young men 
and also on requests for detailed information concerning 
the costs involved In the operation of centers that, had to
h
be closed after only short periods of operation.
In essence, the 0E0 Director and his assistants 
must be able to furnish two types of information, and their 
ability to do this will have a good deal to do with the 
level of appropriations in the coming year. In certain 
cases, the queries leveled at him are openly hostile and 
reflect a thinly veiled attempt to bring discredit on the 
agency by showing that money has been disbursed foolishly 
and perhaps even illegally.
Responding to BOB and Congressional interrogation 
proves a formidable undertaking for reasons that will be 
outlined in more detail later. For now, It will suffice 
to pay that in the proliferation of government agencies 
that has taken place over the last few years, citizens auto­
matically make the assumption that anti-poverty efforts and 
CEO;are inseparable, and misdeeds and errors of judgement
k
U. 8., Congress, House, Department of Labor and 
Health Education and Welfare Appropriations for 1969. 
Hearings before a subcommittee of the House Appropriations 
Committee, House of Representatives, 90th Cong., 2nd sess., 
1968, pp. 93~k.
Qjbid., pp. 41-2. In this instance Congressman 
Michel of Illinois asserted that through the good offices 
of CEO, the Woodlawn Organization, an agency partially 
supported by 0E0 grants, secured the release of four, Mcon­
victed murderers” in order that they might teach in a Wood­
lawn program. Information subsequently furnished by 0E0 
for the record proved that 0E0 had no connection with the 
release of any felons in Illinois, if in fact such an act 
had even transpired.
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6have been incorrectly ascribed to that agency. There 
have been a few spectacular errors, e.g. the Blackstone 
Ranger flap, and from them citizens have been, perhaps, 
too quick in conjuring up an agency built on chicanery.
The most staggering problem is that of supervision. A 
typical Regional Office employs 175. civil service employees, 
and an even smaller number of individuals approve dis­
bursements that will be made to 170 CAAs, each employing 
an average of forty workers.^  To understand the problem 
of supervision, one must look at the Agency1s structure at 
Rational. Regional and Local levels.
There are three levels of organization at 0E0:
Rational Headquarters, The Regional Offices, and the local 
Community Action Agency. Each has discrete respoiisi.bil5.ties, 
and each uses PPBS in a manner appropriate to its function 
and level of skill.
The National Headquarters serves as the chief liaison 
point between the localities and Congress. Its major 
function is to present an integrated anti-poverty plan to
^Xbid., pp. 40-1. Here an allegation was made that 
0E0 had funded, or was contemplating funding a '’social 
eating" venture. Here also OEO demonstrated that it had no. 
connection with such a project, and that it had been con­
sidered under the rubric of the "Older Americans Act," and 
would be supervised by the Department of Health, Education 
and Welfare.
M^r. Prank Rupp, Mid Atlantic Region Director of 
Management Information Systems, Interview held in Washington, 
D.G *, in November, 1968.
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the BOB and Congress. Peripheral to this task is the job 
of approving all grants made to Migrant Worker, American 
Indian and experimental projects. It acts as the national _ 
advocate for the poor, and it is divided by functional 
areas, such as Headstart and Job Corps.
At one time, 8,11 decisions to fund projects, 
irrespective of the target group, were made at the National 
Headquarters. Now, decision-making has been given to a 
series of Regional Offices. The country has been divided 
into seven regions, and the offices for each region has 
.offices for each state included within its borders, as well 
as for the various programs that constitute the concerns of 
0E0.
Finally, there is a series of Community Action 
Agencies (CAAs) across the country. These entities are 
meant to be the basic operations,! unit in the War on 
Poverty. The legal requirements for establishing such 
agencies have expanded and contracted over the four years 
that 0E0 has been in operation. One may state with confi­
dence that a CM. Is a public or private non-profit agency, 
designated by the regular organs of local government. Its 
purpose is to mobilise the resources of the community in 
the job of making poor people self-sufficient. Local govern­
ment, as well as designating the agency to be the official 
anti-poverty agency for the community, may and often does 
appoint members to the agency1 s governing board. The most
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controversial point to date has been the requirement that 
one third of the board’s members be from the target poor 
to be served, and that these individuals be given the 
opportunity to serve to the maximum extent feasible.^
The individual CAA operates on two levels. There 
is a governing board. This body, operating through a series 
of subcommittees, serves to devise a program for the 
agency’s activities during the program year. Typically, 
the board has a program committee, on which a substantial 
number of the members are from the poor community.
Figure 1 shows the pattern by which they should, ideally, 
make plans for the CAA1 s program.
There is also an executive staff in the local agency. 
It Is composed of paid employees who supervise the daily 
operations of the agency. These individuals are not civil- 
service personnel, and they administer the program along 
broad guidelines set by the board. There may be some over­
lap, in that some of the board members may be community 
organizers * and as such work under the supervision of the 
executive staff.
Finally, poor people are brought into the organiza­
tional complex in a number of variant ways. The Richmond 
CAA, known as RCAP, has organized, for example, a series
°U .S., Congress, House, An Act to Provide an .improved 
Economic Opportunity Act of 1967. Pub. L. 90-222, 90th'
Cong., 1st sesso, 19o?, S.2^88, p. 51*
^Subsequent to my research dual membership of this type 
was prohibited, by administrative regulation.
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Executive Office of the President. Office of 
Economic Opportunity,, CAP Management Guide (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1968), p. 12.
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of Neighborhood Advisory-Councils in which the residents of 
poor areas may come together to articulate their needs and 
desires so that they can be taken to the governing board. 
Moreover, there are a number of Community Action Neighbor­
hood Centers, in each of the poverty-stricken*areas of 
Richmond. Each has a permanent staff, and community resi­
dents are encouraged to take their problems to the center 
to seek assistance in meeting their needs. For instance, 
a resident may complain of insufficient street lighting.
The center worker will endeavor to gather other residents 
of the same block so that together they may solve the 
problem. This may involve- writing a group letter to the 
agency manager concerned with the problem or visiting his 
office. The use of such methods, it is hoped, will bring 
about a sense of political efficacy. Additionally, the 
.center worker hopes that this sort of reaction will en­
courage people to come to neighborhood council meetings.
Thus one can see that there is a vast stock of needs to be 
met by such an agency.
The very complexity of 0E0 foreshadows the difficulty 
of realizing, in practice, the goals of planning, execution 
and control. Nevertheless, an attempt has been made to 
institutionalize PPBS at each level of GEO.
The National Headquarters PPBS is governed by the 
budget submission process, and it is coordinated by the 
Office of Research, Plans Programming and Evaluation. 0E0
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must submit its budget proposals to BOB by October 15 of 
the year preceding the fiscal year in which the obligations 
will be made. The process consists of the submission of 
a series of documents and narrative documentation: Pro­
gram Memoranda, the Plan Financial Plan and Special 
Analytical Studies. These serve to explain what the 
agency will do and why.
The Plan Financial Plan that is submitted to the 
BOB is the result of consultation of the National and 
Regional officers. Each Regional Director submits his 
dollar request for operation of 0E0 programs within his 
Region. He bases his wishes on the demonstrated efficiency 
of various agencies in meeting past community problems, 
although he can have no specific idea about what local CAA 
requirement will be. As the observer descends the ad­
ministrative ladder, he would discover that each super­
visor could be more specific about the needs of his 
particular area. He can be more certain about the work 
that has gone into assessing community problems and what
degree of urgency should be attached to a communityr s re-
q
quest for grant funding. He can form clearer judgements 
about the efficiency of the CAA concerned. This pattern of 
de-centralization is one of the most disturbing features 
of the entire 0E0 venture though, for it makes close super-
Q
"interview, Rupp.
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vision of spending virtually impossible* General Accounting 
Office (GAO) inspections reveal honest errors and the more 
sinister chicanery only after the fact
The Inspection of CAA. activities is done by means 
of 0S0 activity inspections, GAO audits and Management 
Information System (MIS) reports* The latter device re­
quires that each agency tabulate details of money disbursed 
and the results gained, though It is of limited value for 
reasons that will be explained in detail later *
In summary, then, the 0E0 is an institution, the 
goal of which is to eliminate the paradox of poverty In 
this, the richest nation on earth. It makes this goal opera­
tional by the establishment of a series of largely federally- 
financed social service centers known as Community Action 
Agencies. These organizations make plans to fight poverty 
In their localities by a combination of pre-packaged 
federal programs and a measure of local ingenuity. PPBS 
has been adapted to 0E0 over the course of the last four 
years, and its value as a tool in decision--making will be 
the concern of the balance of this essay.
I use "chicanery" in its dictionary meaning of 
"deception by artful subterfuge." In the Norfolk Virginian 
Pilot of December A, 1968, there is an article reporting 
the” conviction, on charges of embezzlement of 0E0 funds, of 
the Rev* Terry Wingate, an official associated with the 
Tidewater Virginia CAA, STOP (Southeastern Tidewater 
Opportunity Program).
CHAPTER III
THE IDEA OP A MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM
111 earlier sections, it was suggested that govern­
ment officials, confronted with the task of allocating 
limited resources among competing projects, developed 
PPBS a budget technique In which the costs and benefits 
of alternative public programs are simultaneously dis­
played o Use of this technique requires the development 
of a Management Information System (MIS), so that execu­
tives can tell how well plans are being carried out and
1to change ongoing programs, should this prove necessary<,
-■? An MIS, as has been indicated earlier, is essentiall
:d way of obtaining Information about a given venture and 
putting it before a manager who must melee decisions based 
on ite Though authorities disagree about the specific 
facts that should be presented, they concur in saying that 
it should be more than simply a system of accounting report
p
It should, the experts concur, transmit information 
necessary for the operation of a financial system, such as.
1R. L. Martino, "The Development of a Total Manage­
ment System," In Management Systems, ecu by Peter Schoder- 
beck (New York: Wiley and Sons, 1968), p.* 121.
2Leonard Garrett and Milton Silver, Production
'the balance in an expenditure account, as well as the orga­
nization 1s progress In meeting publicly-announced goads. 
Moreover, one should be able to anticipate organizational 
problems by using MJS data. In doing these jobs, the 
system should be able to transmit Information about the 
atmosphere in which the organization operates.
0E01 s MIS is, structurally a pre-printed form into 
which CAA. managers place s tail sties, indicating for each 
program account, money disbursed, the number, ethnic 
characteristics and income level of those serving end 
those served, as well as the "results" obtained as the end 
product of the disbursement. In a supplement to the 
statistical summary of the report, the CAA Director comments 
on the community atmosphere in the area in which the CAA is 
located. He is required to explain significant shortcomings 
and strengths in the operations, and he is compelled to 
comment on specific problem areas, such as the recruitment 
of managerial personnel. The narrative portion of the 
report Is thus the opportunity for the Director to tell all 
that will help the Regional Offices understand what his
Management Systems (New York: Hare our't, World Inc., 1966). 
p. 6Bo~ and Roland Daniel, "Management Information Crisis, 
in Management Systems. ed. by Peter Schoderbeck (New York: 
Wiley and Sons, 19687, pp. 53~57 and also James D. 
Gallegher, Management Information Systems and the Computer 
(New York: American Management Association, 19617, p To^T*
^Daniel, op. clt., p. 57*
particular problems are.
While this attempt to give the manager the opportu­
nity to speak to the problems of his area does take away 
from the idea that the report is a collection of numbers, 
there is no doubt that it is meant to be an attempt to 
make an agency manager organize his operation in a careful 
and thorough manner. The manual governing the system’s 
use states that the only way for the agency to obtain the 
date, required by MIS is to develop "score cards,n on which
i[
the required information can be tabulated on a daily basis. 
'..-Thus, there is a combination of evaluation in terms of 
■ "numbers that can be presented to Congress and evaluation in 
^terms of subjective data that can be used to help local 
and regional managers think about where their agencies are 
Agoing.
1 ’ That this sytern is clearly intended to be evaluative
Is indicated by the announcement which accompanied the 
adoption of MIS by the Office of Economic Opportunity. 
Theodore M« Berry, the National Community Action Program 
Director declared that MIS was being Inaugurated so that 
henceforth all levels of Community Action Program manage­
ment would be able to measure program progress, in terms
!i
U. S., Executive Office of the President, Office of 
Economic Opportunity, Grantee Reporting Manual (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 19o7j, p. 16.
of objectives. Moreover, the Grantee Reporting Manual holds 
that,
The GAP progress “reporting system attempts to monitor 
the progress of poor people through a series of c 
process steps designed to take them out of poverty.
Thus, a few observations may be ms.de by way of 
6summary, CEO managers may often be reticent, when, asked 
to specify exactly "how" their programs have helped the 
communities in which CAAs are operating. This is for the 
very good reason that the results of agency programs are 
often long range. Moreover, as we shall see later, agency 
managers have often encountered difficulties in obtaining 
funds because they have been unable to demonstrate the 
effectiveness of their ventures, in meeting established 
goals. MIS a.rose to meet this need for information, so that 
directors could test the adequacy of plans they had developed
^Ibid., p. 17.
6This discussion of MIS does not, by design, explain 
the variant methods used to assess the efficiency and im­
pact of 0E0 programs. This is because the ’’management audit” 
and other in depth studies of programs and individual 
agencies focus on the detection of defad.cation and other 
varieties of financial misconduct, not program impact. Also 
Hearings, Appropriations, p. 98. "Frank Murphy, the Assistant 
Director of Job Corps, when queried about GAO reports of its 
audits held, ”what I mean Is that the sort of reports they 
produce for us a.re on an ad hoc basis, are not really manage­
ment instruments for us to use in making management decisions. 
To the same effect Bertrand Harding, Acting Director of 0E0, 
held, ’’the audit activity is primarily a fiscal and financial 
analysis of the Community Action Agency to evaluate the 
accounting system they have and to detect fraud.”
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for social resource development and so that they could ob­
tain money for further ventures. A survey of the efficacy 
of 0E0 MIS will be the subject of the ensuing section.
CHAPTER IV
MIS AND ITS PriEALLS
MIS .has been exceedingly difficult to apply to 0E0 
programs for reasons that will be explained In detail as 
we proceed. To summarize, however*, uneven personnel skill 
has caused ’’result” reporting that is inaccurate and tardy; 
’’results” of 0E0 programs are hard to specify and even more 
difficult to relate to the achievement of broad economic 
goals; and MIS cannot be reliably used as a planning tool. 
This is not to say that CEO has not made tremendous efforts 
to institute an integrated management system for its 
activities. It has consistently, under congressional 
pressure, done this, but the fact remains that given the 
speculative connection of 0E0 programs with measurable 
social progress, there is inevitable vagueness in evaluation 
that must attend this, or any other, social resource develop­
ment program. Let us now look at the reasons that MIS and 
PPBS are hard to relate to 0E0 operations.
Any MIS, whether it serves in a government agency or 
in a profit-making organization, has three distinct functions. 
It first documents the action that is being carried on to 
attain the objectives of the group It serves. It tells
39
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"what is going on,1 Additionally, it relates the affairs
of each segment of the whole organization to the over™
riding purpose for which the organization is established.
Finally, it serves as a planning instrument, with which
1executives in the organization can make future plans.
There has been a good deal of controversy about what,
exactly, it was that 0E0 was established to do. To dispel
confusion, one might well read a few pertinent portions of
the legislation establishing the agency. The "Declaration
of Purpose” for the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, as
amended, holds that,
. , , it is therefore the policy of the United 
..States to eliminate the paradox of poverty in the midst 
of plenty. . . by opening to everyone the opportunity 
for education. . . the opportunity to work and the 
opportunity to live in decency and dignity.2
The Act, with its five titles, authorizes the carrying out
of this policy and declares that one way to do this is to
provide a Community Action Program (CAP) that will mobilize
the resources of the whole community--national, state, and
3.ocal— -to make the poverty™stricken self sufficient." Thus,
by logical extension, an MIS to be effective, must show how
1
Daniel, "Management Information Crisis,” p. 54.
o
"U.S., Congress, AN Act to Provide An Improved Eco­
nomic Opportunity Act of 19571 Pub. L.”90-2.22, 90th Cong., 
1st sess., 1957'/'S.2538, p. 1.
^Ibid., p. 27.
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the purposes for which this program was established are 
being carried out, and moreover, it should show how 
change can be carried out, when earlier plans have not 
worked well* Ideally, an examination of the facts should 
show that the GAA Director, when he discovers that a need, 
and enthusiasm exist for a program, he and the agency can 
execute-it.
How does the MIS function, and what have its 
problems been, as it has reported activities in the CAP?
Mien MIS was introduced, a series of administrative 
memoranda declared, that its purpose was to tell who was
!i
being helped by 0E0 programs. In providing the informa­
tion, it would not only document the efforts being made to 
eliminate poverty, it would, its apologists held, serve to 
give the CAAs information indispensible for the planning of 
future problems. Early memoranda predicted that it would 
take time” to make MIS operational, but that after a brief 
initial period, the GAAs would discover that they had a 
splendid planning tool, well worth all the effort that 
would have to be ms.de to implement it.
As has been indicated earlier, MIS requires that a.
4U.S., Executive Office of the President, Office of 
Economic Opportunity, Community Action Memoranda Series,
No. 71, p. 1.
rp
"II* S., Executive Office of the President, Office of 
Economic Opportunity, Community Action Memoranda Series,
No* 6?, p. 1*
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CAA report three categories of information: (l) the number
of participants in its programs, (2) their ethnic and in­
come characteristics, and (5) the "results” of dollar dis­
bursements. This requires that the agency maintain detailed 
records of all its contacts, and it has led to problems 
that are both clerical and conceptual in character, as we 
can tell from looking briefly at the Richmond Community Action
C
Program, RCAP.
The clerical problems are largely derived from the 
fact that RCAP1s activities are carried out through the 
agency of five neighborhood centers, staffed largely by a 
combination of professionals, VISTA personnel, and in­
digenous poor. Moreover, established groups, such as the 
Richmond Public Schools, conduct programs such as HEADSTART, 
and groups such as the Virginia Union University and the 
Richmond Chamber of Commerce have conducted RCAP programs.
This has led to a great disparity in the skill level of the
reporting agencies and has meant that ROAP's report has been
7tardy and not wholly accurate.1 
bIt could, of course, be that Richmond and RCAP are 
not "typical," but I know of no evidence that leads me to 
believe that they are unique with regard to the problems 
under discussion.
^Mr. Frank Rupp, MIS Specialist Mid Atlantic Region 
CEO, Interview held in Washington, D.C., September i960. Mr. 
Rupp indicated that RCAP's problems were typical of all 
agencies in the region, in that they touched upon tardiness 
and accuracy, but they were not of great proportions.
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The important point to remember here is that this
tardiness is a normal condition of operation and unrelated
to any suggestion of misconduct. It is part of business
in a larger bureaucracy.
The initial reaction to the MIS at RCAP was that it
was, n just another Washington report 111, imposed by an
unsympathetic bureaucracy that was unaware of the demands
made on agency time, and the limited supply of top
o
managerial talent. There was, at first, talk that the
agency would be compelled to close its doors for one day
a: month, in order to tabulate the data from all of the t
neighborhood centers. Despite this initially unfavorable
reaction, agency officers went to Washington In May 1968,
for a series of MIS training sessions. These focused not
only on the requirements for MIS reporting, but also on
techniques that would lead to more reliable planning, and
they were part of a regional management improvement pro- 
10gram. Equipped with this technics,1 information, the maga- 
gers returned to Richmond to educate their neighborhood 
workers in MIS techniques.
The first training session for target-area poor
q
John Chiles, Assistant Director RCAP, Interview held 
in Richmond, Virginia, October, 1968.
^Ibld„
10“ Interview, Rupp. Management teams from compsjiies 
such as Arthur D. Little are in the process of visiting 
all CAAs in the Mid Atlantic region.
people was held la June 1968. At this session, conducted 
In RCAP * s central offices, there was an. air of consterna­
tion and disgust. This was caused by the difficulties that 
these individuals encountered in obtaining the information 
required by MIS. For example, in compiling totals of 
individuals "reached” by RCAP, many of the workers found 
it difficult to distinguish between a person who had 
"walked in" to a center and those who had been "outrenched" 
by the center1 s workers. Totals of persons reached by 
various methods were often inaccurate. In isolated cases, 
persons who had left employment programs to accept jobs 
had been listed erroneously as "dropouts." ^  Since the 
workers had applied themselves to the task of gathering 
information assiduously, there was discouragement and 
questioning that ran to the general effect of, "just what 
does all this mean anyhow?1
An assistant director of RCAP, addressing himself 
to the question of the substance of MIS reporting declared 
that the execution of MIS reporting Involves a "numbers
1 p
game" of spectacular proportions. * To determine whether or 
not this charge is correct, one must consider the type of 
information that is generated by a report and how it is used 
in documenting the coverage of programs, reporting the
11
“ Interview, Chiles.
i2lbid.
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satisfaction of broad economic goals and planning for the 
future. In maiding this examination, let us remember the 
declared purpose of the Economic Opportunity Act: namely
to mobilize community resources to make poor individuals 
self-sufficient. 0E0 measures self-sufficiency by whether
a man1s income places him above or below a "poverty line," 
currently defined as an annual income of 3>200 dollars for 
an urban family of four. ^  As good a program as any to 
examine is the Richmond HEADSTART venture.
The Fall quarter, 1968, MIS report indie ah es that, 
working through the Richmond Public School System, RCAP 
sponsored a Pull Year HEADSTART program.1  ^ It served 104 
participants, and in doing so, spent a, total of 17,000 
dollars. The vast majority of these youngsters were five 
years of age, Negro, and came from families whose income 
placed them below the poverty line. Evidence indicates 
that 58 children received medical care that continued on 
into the next quarter, and that nearly 10 percent were 
mentally-retarded. It shows that six, or only four percent, 
were from families with incomes above the poverty line.
This latter fact is not too alarming, since'HEADSTART
lb ■ 'hieS., Executive Office of the President, Office of
Economic Opportunity, Community Action Memoranda Series,
No. 67™5,.p. 1.
11
RCAP MIS Report, dated October 18, 1968. Unless 
otherwise cited all references to HEADSTART facts are 
derived from this source.
regulations stipulate that up to 10 percent of the program 
participants may be drawn from the non-poor. Furthermore, 
families whose sole source of income is public assistance
ISmay qualify for the program, whatever their income level. ^
The report goes on to say that 17 children came from
families who received public assistance, though there is
no way of telling what portion of their income was derived
from these payments. \
Thus, at the documentary level, the report functions
in an excellent manner. It demonstrates that, in the case
of this particular venture, Richmond organisations
affiliated with the public schools and the churches, did
commit funds and resources to an activity, the benefits of
which went to the intended beheficiaries. The RCAP assistant
director, though, skeptical about the overall value of MIS,
did admit that in the sense that it prevented the abuse of
a program meant for the poor of Richmond, it had served a
useful function. In the past, he related, there had been
abuses of the HEADSTART program precisely because such a
16safeguard did not exist. However, there are levels of
15u *S ., Executive Office of the President, Office of 
Economic Opportunity,•Headstart Child Development (Washington 
Government Printing Office, 19677, pV ST'
16Interview, Chiles. This Is a hotly contested point. 
At page 97 of his Review of Economic Opportunity Programs, 
the Comptroller General of the United Stales holds that of 
557 children enrolled in 11 centers, 22 percent were found 
to have been from families above the poverty line. However,
*7
Information that go well beyond documentation, and we would 
do well to consider them.
In offering the HEADSTART program as part of its 
anti-poverty tools, 0E0 and RCAP have made the assumption 
that poor children are peculiarly vulnerable to the prob­
lems of ill-health, under-education and general cultural
ennui, and that it is the legitimate function of government
17to attack these conditions, 1 Moreover, it has assumed
that there will be incremental change that can be measured
1 o
to give some indication of program success. Its most 
important assumption is that, if one reads the language 
of the Economic Opportunity Act, that this venture will help 
bring people out of poverty. It is here that MIS reporting 
breaks down, and it does so for the reason that it is hard 
to measure, in the present, long-range potential social 
change vdth the use of statistics or any current indicators, 
and it is virtually impossible to relate incremental change 
to dollar disbursements. Furthermore, the'relationship be­
tween internal motivational change and economic development
in view of Mr, Chilesf candor it seems proper to accept his 
characterization of the Richmond situation as correct.
17
Head start/, Child Development, p. 1,
°U.S., Congress, Senate, Criteria for Evaluation in 
Planning State and Local Programs, A study pursuant to 
S, Res. 55.? 90th Cong., 1st sessT, 1967; P- 9«
is tenuous. The narrative portion of the report does
attempt to depict social change, but a skillfully written
19report can give a false impression of progress.  ^ Further­
more, no parent wants to use his child as part of a control 
group to determine what the consequences of neglect and the 
benefits of attention are.
As they face this dilemma of immeasurability, 
planners at all levels, are forced to ask, "how good is 
HEADSTART, when compared with another program as a. potential 
claimant on funds in the federal budget?” In other words, 
how measurable and direct are the benefits of this or any ' 
other 0E0 program, as they seek to achieve broad economic 
goals?
There is evidence suggesting that HEADSTART does in­
deed increase the poor child’s readiness to learn, in the
20conventional school setting. However, this benefit is 
related to anti-poverty efforts, only insofar as it prepares 
the children to undertake employment or higher education,
^%lr. Louis Bailey, Field .Representative, Mid Atlantic 
Region 0E0, Interview held in Washington, D.C. September,
19b8. Mr. Bailey indicated that well written reports can 
say nothing and that he, as a trained social worker, must 
visit the site of operations to tell what the quality of a 
program is.
20This too, is an arguable point. In Review of 
Economic Opportunity Programs, the Comptroller General holds, 
TrFrom the testing techniques as were made available to us at 
the centers where we made examinations, children who had 
participated in HEADSTART, made modest gains in social, 
motivational and educational skills.
fifteen years later. The report, taken by itself, does not 
and cannot measure the quality of the program, offered by 
the individual CAA. In effect MIS operates on the assump­
tion that HEADSTART is efficacious and that other pre­
packaged programs, designed to a great extent in Washington 
are effective. By and large, funds are earmarked for use 
in programs that have a large clientele and are popular 
politically. That the funding question has been made 
"political” is understandable, but it means that the alloca­
tion of funds may have nothing to do with a program’s pro­
fessional merits.
The issue of criteria, or conditions of success,
becomes even more crucial, in approaching program accounts
such s,s "Administration and Organization." The declared
purpose of, "community organization,” for example. Is to,
encourage anti-poverty program participation. It in­
cludes Involving residents of low-income neighborhoods 
in the affairs of their own community by encouraging pp 
people to organize and direct their own efforts. . .
An indicator used to measure achievement of this purpose is
the, "number of community meetings held, M and the,
"attendance at those meetings ♦" This is a very legitimate
way of gauging activity, but it really doesn’t tell us very
21U.S., Executive Office of the President, Office of 
Economic Opportunity, Grantee Reporting Manual (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1967 )7~P• 102.
much/ since it doesnit tell us much about the number of
22problems solved or attitudes changed.
The plain fact is that the programs with which the 
0E0 is associated, even the widely-acclaimed HEADSTART, 
deal in "results” that cannot be quantified with precision. 
We can be relatively certain that some good will come from 
them, but the amount and duration of that good are specula­
tive. The only satisfactory evaluations that have been 
done with respect to CEO programs have been done in great = 
depth and have taken long periods of tine into consideration
as in the Glen Cain study of the Job Corps and the General1
2dAccounting Office study of the entire war on poverty. "
The former of these two reports was informative 
exactly because it endeavored to relate dollars disbursed 
to important gains in educational ability and earning capa­
city, the only sensible justification for conducting an anti 
poverty program. In doing so, it made more detailed informa 
tion available than could possibly be provided, by an MIS 
report. For example, by referring to it, the reader can
22The report would say nothing of the hostilities 
generated by articulating needs, only to discover that 
they could not be met, given the level or variety of re­
sources in the community.
P'iU.S., Congress, Joint Committee Report, Review of 
Economic Opportunity Programs, A Study pursuant to Title II 
1967 Amendments to the Economic Opportunity Act of 196 A,
91st Cong., 1st sess., 196 9, P« 2. This document required 
lA months to complete and was the result of "spot" examina­
tions of hundreds of files at CAAs across the country.
discover that for each five months in a Joh Corps camp,, the
participant gains the benefits of nearly a year of formal
education. This costs the taxpayers 3510 dollars and will
24benefit the trainee in the amount of 3710 dollars.
Furthermore, the explanatory tables included in the body
of the report enable the reader to determine how much
benefit the trainee would gain from different given periods
25of time in the Corps. ^ These benefits are measured in
terms of increase in earning power, and for a one year
period in the training program offered by Job Corps, the
enroilee will gain about 35 cents an hour . t o  spending 
26power.~ in presenting these figures, Cain makes the
important point that,
No allowance is made for any benefits that stem from 
.• general improvement in civic behaviour, lower crime 
rates, more stable family relationships, better'up-” 
bringing of children they will have or other such, 
hard to measure consequences of a youth’s experience
in the C o r p s . 2?
The CEO MIS should, relate to the broad purpose of 
movement across the poverty line, but even in connection with 
employment programs such as the 1968 RCAP/Chamber of Commerce
24U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Education and 
Lab or, Economic Opportunity Act Amendments of 1967, 
Hearings before the Committee, ’ House of Representatives on 
H.R. 8311, 90th Cong., 1st sess*, 1967, p. 2371.
Summer work enterprise, MIS data is unsatisfactory, if one 
wants to determine how many individuals were raised In 
economic status„ Its enrollees had their incomes raised by 
200 dollars per month for each of the two months that they 
were enrolled in the program, and the information submitted 
by MIS report shows that 51 of the 260 participants went on
pO
to college in the Fall. This does not say, however, how 
many people were raised above the poverty line, nor does 
it say anything about the individual changes that students 
may have undergone. The narrative portion of the report 
speaks of, "an attitude of understanding and development of 
a. sense of pride, but then these are standard phrases 
In any report. The melancholy fact seems to be that there 
is no accurate way to relate dollars disbursed to improve­
ment in the earning capacity of the beneficiary, his 
chances for a better life, or the social costs of crime, 
juvenile delinquency or unemployment.
We indicated earlier that an MIS is supposed to 
function as a planning device, but this is difficult at 0E0 
because by requiring the MIS reports to be submitted every 
quarter, little long-term planning Is possible. The RCAP 
assistant director even maintains that this means that no
October 18, 1968, pages
unnumbered„
advanced planning can be done with MIS, since it gives no
indication or prediction of upswings in community interest
30in RCAP or its individual programs.
Thus, at the local level, there has developed the
feeling that the 0E0 MIS is a collection of numbers, and
nothing more, designed for the sole purpose of justifying
a program to Congress. Its critics, in saying that it has
little or nothing to do with program variety or funding
levels, could well point to the testimony of CAP Director :
Theodore M, Berry. Speaking to Congressman Melvin Laird,
he declared that MIS was developed for the sole purpose of.
presenting hard fact summaries to congressmen who sit on
31Appropriations Committees. There is thus consternation 
on the part of local CAA managers, when confronted with the,
.I!:lf you can't count it, it doesnft countn thinking made 
/plain by Berry's testimony. 0E0 has, however, in the past 
year developed an HIntegrated management system” for Its 
own operations that has enabled it to counter the changes of 
MIS critics who suggested that the report was wholly
^Interview, Chiles.
33 i'Hearings, Appropriations * p . 224. "I am happy to
say that the management information system— which we designed
and. instructed the community action agencies in its use--is
now beginning to produce the kind of data on which this type
of presentation is based. Much of the data presented here
is the result of the reporting system through our MIS. The
system provides information on the community action agencies
programs, their costs, what participants are being served
and what is happening to them.”
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meaningless.
Basically, uintegrated management1 refers to a view 
of decision-making in which an organization is viewed as 
established to serve one overriding function or purpose.
Its divisions may be linked by electronic information 
transfer devices, and each division's actions are animated 
by the single purpose of the organisation. The manager 
must be able to bring the activities of one division into 
harmony with those ,of the others.
The concept of integrated management has been given 
legislative approval, since congressional critj .Gismo of 0B0 
have not centered so much on the worthiness of the goal 
of conquering poverty as they have on the waste of funds 
that has come about because of slipshod administration and 
proven dishonesty.^ Criticisms have taken legislative 
form In the 1967 Amendments to the 1964 Economic Opportunity
"52 ^Martino, ,fThe Development of A Total Management 
System, ” p. 123.
.S., Congress, Senate, Riots, Civil and Criminal 
Disorders, Hearings before 'the Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigations.of the Committee on Government Operations, 
Senate, Pursuant to S.Res. 216, 90th Cong., 2nd sess., 1968, 
p. 2740. Senator McClellen, in an Investigation of 0E0 
financing of an educational project in which functionally 
Illiterate hoodlums were used as teachers, commented, ’5I 
just can’t understand that we could have a project financed 
by the government with all those things going on. . , while 
the head of an agency. . . diligence was being exercised, 
just the normal diligence to see that the project was going 
right, and that money was properly spent?1
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Act. ‘ The most important stipulation for our purposes is 
the section in which the Director of 0E0 is prohibited from 
granting funds to CAAs that have not adopted a ,fsystematicn 
approach to their use."^ This means that the individual CAA 
must establish its goals, give them relative priority, and 
periodically evaluate the execution of programs designed to 
carry out goals.'"
The Regional Office, in which the funding authority 
for most OAA programs is vested, has developed a basically 
six'-pronged attack or approach with which to carry out the 
inspection and funding of a CAA (See Figure 2). A. given 
number of days before the beginning of the new program year, 
eachvCAA submits documents establishing its legal title to 
be the anti-“poverty agency for the community, and prior to 
the beginning of the program year, it receives a Field. Pre- 
Review. After this review, it submits its fun,ding request 
for the coming year.
The significance of this new procedure is that it 
permits the funding authorities to inspect the operations of
xii
An Act To Provide An Improved Economic Opportunity 
Act, p. 1.
^ Ibld,, p. 36c.
U .S., Executive Office of the President, Office of
Economic Opportunity, Applying For A CAP Grant, OEQ 
Instruction Series, NoTc/flO-l, p~ T-l.
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the agency, prior to investing any money in its ventures .
During this meeting, program and funding levels are set, and
they are later confirmed by a "letter of understanding,"
issued by the Regional office. At this meeting, in which
the CAAf s board participate, the regional grantors tell
the local authorities of their general impression of the
CAA1s management and overall effectiveness. Methods of
.evaluating proposed programs are also discussed, and it may
be agreed that MIS reports will be the sole method of
evaluating many of the programs that will be established*
.The "letter of understanding,1 which follows the meeting,
is explicit in telling the CAA, "how much it will get,15 and
the local and regional officials are adamant in holding
that the funding intentions made public at the meeting are 
go
firm c
Hardness of budgetary commitments is required by the 
fact that at the same time that local and regional personnel 
are negotiating, national personnel may be carrying out 
their job of obtaining funds for the whole 0E0 program from 
Congress. CAA budget years and the federal fiscal year 
overlap. For example, the RCAP budget year begins each 
October 1, while the federal fiscal year begins on July 1„
38,^ Mr. Chiles said that he saw? no virtue to a well-* 
written proposal, because he wondered if anyone really 
read it. Mr. Bailey held that the best-written appeal 
might be of no avail, if "there was just no money.
58
OEO appropriations measures for the fiscal year 1969 were 
not signed into law until the early part of October, and the 
national offices operated under a "continuing resolution,". 
which prohibited it from incurring obligations in fiscal 
1969 at a rate higher than fiscal 1968.^ This meant that 
by the end of the summer of 1968, RCAP1 s budget had to be 
cut, as part of a general economy drive. Even without this 
extraordinary contingency, a CAA can increase its program
I | y*\
only by about 15 percent a year if that much IL
Along with the general scarcity of funds Congress 
has placed specific restriction on types of programs that 
OEO may conduct and the beneficiaries it may aid. Con­
sequently, OEO officials have had to establish limits to 
funds and types and levels of programs that are available 
to /the Individual agency. Funds are scarce, and the alloca­
tion once made (as part of a shared process in which the 
Field Representative and the District Manager sit down to 
‘hash out" the CAA’s level) is a fairly well-fixed figure* 
Thus, MIS or any other form of analysis, no matter how
•59
^wMr. Paul Roys ton, Assistant Administrator for CAP 
Mid Atlantic Region, Interview held in Washington, D.C., 
October, 1968,
40Interview, Roys ton. And also OEO responded to 
GAO%s report on its activities as follows, "for the fiscal 
year beginning July 1, 1967* OEO did not receive its 
appropriation until January 1, 1968, after half of the 
operating year had passed.- Community Action Programs, 
particularly, have suffered from these funding problems."
favorably it depicts the activities of an individual CAA, 
will not make much difference in its ultimate funding 
level.
CHAPTER V
THE RAZE THAT IS OEO
Thus far, this essay has considered the "mechanics" 
of how one of OEO1s major evaluative tools, MIS, operates. 
We have also seen that the limited utility of MIS, and 
thus PPBS, Is in part related to the quality of information 
it produces. There is, however, another limitation: the
political milieu in which OEO must operate * The milieu 
which must be mastered If OEO is to gain the funds 
necessary to stay alive on the Washington scene. Thus, 
one can state that while PPBS does form a good way of pre­
senting a plan for the execution of any legitimate govern­
mental function, complete with supporting justifications 
and explanations of costs and impacts and benefits, there 
are some other questions that one must answer. Any cost- 
benefit analysis, however accurate It may be, must still 
pass muster politically.
Aaron Wildavsky, in The Politics of the BudgetaryMn.iiri^ n.iii.i     1.1 i—i —mm ■ iiwiinm.«» —" i . i   — n— »«.»   ■ u .i «n i n ■' '■ •» in i
Process, does a good deal to destroy the myth that public 
expenditure can be placed securely on a rational, non­
political base, such as that envisaged by those who are 
committed to program budgeting. Essentially he holds that
1budgeting is a. game, in which there are two fundamental 
objectives, "defending the base," and, "expanding the
p
base." These two terms refer to the process of establish­
ing a firm level of commitment and increasing this bane by 
small yearly increments. Wildavsky maintains that an 
agency leader who is successful in the struggle to accomplish 
these ends relies on three tactics: (i) he must create and,/
or maintain a clientele of concerned citizens who benefit 
from the agency’s work; (2) he must develop and uphold a 
reputation for honesty and efficiency In the agency; and 
(5) his group must produce a "useful product/' The pay-off—  
one way or the other— will- come in legislative and appropria­
tions hearings. Without evidence of support, without 
reputation and demonstrated effectiveness, the Bureau 
leader will find it difficult to "defend, his base," let 
alone, "expand his b a s e . H o w  does OEO meet these condi­
tions for bureaucratic success in Washington? Let us con­
sider, In succession, each of the three points just cited.
The poor are numerous--estimate of their number 
ranging from 25 to 50 million persons--and thus OEO has a
^Aaron Wildavsky, The Politics of _tbe Budgetary Pro­
cess (pew York: Little Brown and Co., 19S¥)7~p. 6.™
2Ibid., p. 15.
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li
large potential clientele. Moreover, there has been a 
growing feeling that those who are poor are not wicked and 
depraved, but merely people who should be given help in 
reaching the good life. In part this has been derived from 
the fact that many poor people are Negroes, and their 
situation is the result of the shocking long-term discrimina­
tion that has deprived them their rights as men and citizens.
However many poor people there are, they are hard to 
gather into a single organization so that an organization r 
like OEO can deal with their problems systematically or 
effectively. The poor are diverse and their problems go 
beyond the simple lack of money. Included in their ranks 
are blacks, unemployed old pensioners, dependent children, 
tuberculous coal miners, school dropouts arid migratory 
workers« The poor are ail around us, yet hard to locate 
and harder still to organize. Pluralism is as true of the 
poor as it is of the rest of America.
The poor are hindered by the very problems from 
which they are trying to escape. They have a low sense of 
efficacy. They lack the skill of associating for common
l!
'Harrington, The Other America, pp. 1-59* All other 
references to the exact dimensions of poverty, such as they 
are, are extracted from Harrington. Of most importance to 
our theme, perhaps, is the statement that, 15the poor are 
invisible, n politically, for the res,son that they do not 
belong to traditional organizations with power such as 
labor unions, because they are unemployed. Thus they have 
no way of using the steady pressure that characterizes the 
activities of successful pressure groups in Washington.
purposes* Many are illiterate and thus unable to write to 
their congressman. Their very illness, isolation, and. 
depression turns them away from politics as a means of 
salvation. Thus OEO, or any other organisation attempting 
to help the poor (and there is seemingly no argument over 
the moral worthiness of this goal) will have self-defeating 
problems. Even though, one can mobilize some of the poor 
by giving them a voice in local group discussion, the 
actual base of support for OEO is small and relatively 
ineffective.
The most visible demonstrations against poverty 
have been inextricably connected with problems of racial 
discrimination, as in the 1965 March on Washington and the 
1968 Poor Peoples1 Campaign. These demonstrations, have, 
however, been sporadic, largely unrelated to OEO programs, 
and have carried with them the additional hazard of 
creating a serious reaction to all antipoverty efforts.
The demonstrations have concentrated on obtaining "here 
and now'1 benefits such as additional food and jobs for the 
indigent. There has been violence, and the most recent 
demonstrations, which have included demands for "repara­
tions" for abuses from established churches, have inspired 
fear on the part of many citizens, who might otherwise be 
in sympathy with the legitimate goals of poor people.
The fact that OEO has been compelled to. work with 
such a clientele end to include them in its operations has
meant that it has not always been able to present a model of 
efficient and honest administration to Congress,, This has 
hurt it in dealing with legislators.
As has been previously indicated,-' OEO1s critics 
have faulted it chiefly for its slipshod management 
practices. They point to duplication of effort that they 
consider wasteful. For instance, Mrs, Edith Green, Congress* 
woman from Oregon, pointed out that in Pittsburgh a year of 
HEADSTART cost 580 dollars, while a year of a similar pro­
gram, funded under the rubrics of the Elementary Education 
Act costs but 250 dollars.^ HEADSTART costs for the same , 
type of program have been far from uniform. Other critics 
have suggested that OEO was established for the sole purpose 
of gaining support in the 1964 elections*^ The facts seem
to indicate that OEO was established to operate by delega­
cy
tion and in doing so serve as a goad to other agencies. 
Nevertheless, there has been wide dispersion of antipoverty 
effort within the federal government, and it has not all 
been, desirable.
-43 ee again Chapter Four, note 55.
6 ,Hearings. Education and labor, p. 2749.
^"Congress and The Johnson Antipoverty Program,”
Congress1onal Divest, March 1966, Vol. 45, p. 89.
^Levine, ^Program Budgeting For An InterAgency 
Program,” p. 4. .And also Review of Economic Opportunity 
Programs. p. 17.
A great amount of this dispersion has been caused 
by the fa,ct that there has never been clea,r agreement about 
whether OEO was to be an operating agency, with power to 
fund programs directly or merely a coordinating agency with
Q
slight fiscal power. In arriving at a structure for OEO,
a compromise was reached* The responsibility for some
programs was vested in old established agencies such as
the Department of labor, with the expertise and personnel
to operate effectively in a given area® Other programs,
such as the more visible HEADSTART and JOB CORPS were left
in OEO to give it financial leverage.*1*0
The dispersion of antipoverty efforts has been
accomplished in a number of ways. The original Economic
Opportunity Act, for instance, called for OEO to operate
a: Work/Study program so that needy college students could
continue their education. The 1965 Higher Education Act,
signed Into law shortly thereafter, transferred this
responsibility to the Office of Education In The Department
11of Health, Education and Welfare.
A more common practice, however, has been to delegate
°Ben Seligman, '’Poverty and Power,n in Aspects of 
Poverty ed, by Ben Seligman (New York: Crowell, 1968},
1 0Ibid*
11‘ to Act to Provide an Improved Economic Opportunity
the responsibility for prograin operation to other agencies* 
In this fashion, 0E0, recognizing that it has neither the 
talent nor the personnel required to conduct a given pro­
gram, transfers the operational responsibility for it to 
a pre-existing organ of national, state or local govern­
ment* This means that the delegate agency, such as the 
Department of labor or the Richmond Public School System,
will conduct a program and make evaluations jointly with 
12OEOf ' The agency will receive s, transfer of funds from
0E0 and, as is the case with CEP, contract with a local
business man to operate the program * The CAA in the area 1
will usually establish a policy advisory group to maintain
lbsome control over the venture* ^
The evidence about the delegation of programs for 
fiscal 1968 indicates that a total of 1*771*1 billion 
dollars was appropriated to 0E0, and that of this, 5^5•6 
million dollars was spent in programs outside 0E0. Should 
we assume that funding levels remain constant, the total 
dollar amount to be administered by agencies outside 0E0 
will increase by nearly 600 million dollars, when HEADSTART 
arid JOB CORPS are transferred to The Department of Health, 
Education and Welfare and the Department of Labor
12“ Hearings, Appropriations, p« 123* 
‘^ulnt erv i ew 9 Chil e s *
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Ir­respectively*
At both the national and the local levels, the 
dispersion of funding authority and operational responsi­
bility has proven troublesome and fascinating. I n  certain
cases, administrators do not know the source of their
15funding ~ for ongoing programs. The local leader learns,
too, that there is more than one way to attain a desired
objective. The RCAP assistant director observed that
during the 1969 Prefunding Review, the need and enthusiasm
for a legal services component for RCAP was demonstrated.
The agency was told, however, that there was "no money"
for such a venture. However, several months later, after
a telephone call from Washington, the agency applied for
a CEP, a prominent feature of which will be a legal
1
services branch. What we confront is an. agency that has 
administratively been given the responsibility for over­
coming a social problem of spectacular proportions, but has 
never been given the power to carry out its responsibilities. 
Given the broad fragmentation of funding authority, one 
might very well ask who is really in charge of 0E0 
operations *
There is the closely related problem of honesty of 
3 k
‘ R e v ie w  o f  E c o n o m ic  O p p o r t u n i t y  P r o g r a m s , p. 2o. 
lb^H e a r in g s , A p p r o p r i a t i o n s  * p. It3.
16Interview, Chiles.
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operations with which 0E0 must deal. There have been highly 
visible administrative "foul-ups" that have involved 
criminal acts, associated 'with 0E0 operations. The most 
notorious has been the affair in which the 0E0 funded an 
experimental program in which "classes" were "taught" by 
members of the Blackstone Hangers, a juvenile gang. How­
ever, these are isolated and 0E0 leaders have been quick 
to accept full responsibility for them. They do not so 
much show the criminal element in 0E0 as they show tbe 
problems of a group who must deal at "arms length" with 
local communities, on problems with a broadly-connected 
theme, anti-poverty. Moreover, such an incident tells us 
little about the problem of demonstrating ordinary
effectiveness of a governmental agency, the crucial
17problem under discussxon here.'"'
The most serious problem faced by GEO, or any other 
e,gency dealing with this problem, would be to document its 
usefulness, its raison d!etre on the Washington scene.
Here, the observor should consider some of the reasons 
commonly cited for the establishment of GEO* Here also
I"71 Hearings,, Appropriations, p. 38. Here the remarks 
of Congressman Natcher are pertinent. He said to Acting 
Director Bertrand Harding, As the new Director of this 
organisation, if you will pull this program together, con­
vince the people in this country that you are spending the 
money right /sic_7 and producing results, you will have no 
trouble with this committee and you will have no trouble 
vii th c onp<r e s s. "
one must be exceedingly careful. For citizens can commonly 
agree on the moral necessity for ’’doing something about the 
poor,5’ but they are not in agreement about n what5 to do, how 
it should be done, or what in fact has been accomplished*
A common argument to support the forming of 0E0 is 
that by establishing such a new agency, "fresh approaches” 
to the operation of social resource development programs 
would develop* Specific evidence to demonstrate that 0E0 
has met this goal is hard to establish. The Headmaster of 
Mount Herman School, where an 0E0 UPWARD BOUND program de­
signed to prepare poor children for campus life was 
established, was asked this precise question, in Education 
and Labor hearings. Could a child get more from UPWARD 
BOUND or from a similar program, established by the Department
of Health, Education and Welfare? His answer was, 551 don*t
*1 Rthink 1 should comment, because I don * t know.1 At a later 
point, however, he complimented 0E0 on its "fresh approaches” 
to social problems.
Another contention has been that older welfare program 
were not only inefficient, but that in doing a poor job they 
tended to stigmatize citizens as shiftless and no-good. 0E0 
programs, it was said, would give a hand up and not a hand 
out, and in so doing would help people maintain their self- 
respect. It is difficult to tell whether this end has come
“j o
Hearings, Education and Labor, p. 1786.
^ Hearings, Education and Labor, p. 1787.
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about in precisely the manner envisaged b y  0E0 planners. In 
asking about the fiscal 1969 appropriations for the Concen­
trated Employment Programs (C E P S ), Representative Bob Casey 
of Texas cited the experience of a woman In his district 
who needed on-the-job training in order to get a, job. She 
fell outside the Mtarget area” of the CEP, and she was 
rapidly losing hope. Who should he see, asked Casey, to
discover, "just what is going on in the Houston, Texas
20area,15 so that he could help this lady? '
A final related problem with earlier programs is
that clients formerly felt that the social worker was in
her office just to see that forms were properly filled out,
andthat she had nothing to do with the level of aid given
21to the client. Treatment of this sort is implicit in the 
complaints of CAA officials whose applications for programs 
have been turned down. Prior to the use of the Grant 
Application Process, no reasons were given. Today1s explana­
tion that there is no money does little to counter the effects 
of hopes that have been needlessly raised.
Essentially, there are a number of reasons that PPBS 
cannot be of more than limited utility in helping the
20^ H e a r in g s , A p p r o p r i a t i o n s , p. 1A6.
21S c o t t  B r i a r ,  "R a c e  P o v e r t y  a n d  t h e  L a w , "  i n  A s p e c ts  
o f  P o v e r t y  e d .  b y  B e n  S e l ig m a n  (N ew  Y o r k :  C r o w e l l ,  i 9 6 0 )
p. 228.
22'H e a r in g s ,  E d u c a t io n  a n d  L a b o r , p .  1699*
OEO B u re a u  le a d e r  f i n d  h i s  w a y  i n  t h e  m aze o f  p o l i t i c a l  
d e a l i n g s  i n  w h ic h  h e  i s ,  o f  n e c e s s i t y ,  p la c e d « F i r s t ,  t h e r e  
i s  d i f f i c u l t y  i n  o b t a i n i n g  t r a i n e d  o p e r a t i n g  p e r s o n n e l ,  a  
p r o b le m  p a r t i a l l y  s o lv e d  b y  s e n d in g  m a n a g e m e n t te a m s  
t h r o u g h o u t  t h e  c o u n t r y  i n  t h e  m a n n e r  e a r l i e r  s u g g e s te d *
A  m o re  im p o r t a n t  c o n s id e r a t i o n ,  h o w e v e r ,  i s  t h e  
e m p h a s is  o n  q u a n t i t a t i v e  i n f o r m a t i o n  a n d  t h e  s m a l l  g u id a n c e  
t h a t  i t  g iv e s  i n  s u c h  a n  a r e a .  RCAP* s a s s i s t a n t  d i r e c t o r  
c o n fe s s e d  t o  w r y  r e l i e f  w hen  h i s  M IS  r e p o r t  f o r  t h e  p r o ­
g ra m  y e a r  1 9 6 8  sh o w e d  t h a t  1 0 ,0 0 0  i n d i v i d u a l s  h a d  b e e n  C on­
ors
t a c t e d .  B u t  t h i s  sh o w e d  l i t t l e  a b o u t  h o w  m any  p e o p le  
h a d  m o v e d  a c r o s s  t h e  p o v e r t y  l i n e  a s  t h e  r e s u l t  o f  RCAP1 s
work.
This is for the good reason that such information 
does not, and cannot, exist. The County and City Data Book, 
a s u p p le m e n t  to the Census that is updated only every ten 
years, shows that In 1960, 5156 families, or 24.5 percent 
of the total Richmond families had incomes of less than 
5000 dollars. ' No further information is available, and 
even if It were, there would be no way to attribute moving 
across the poverty line to the activities of any one 
agency. Thus the Richmond News-Leader could, as it did on .
^ I n t e r v i e w ,  C h i l e s .
24U . S . ,  D e p a r tm e n t  o f  C om m erce , B u re a u  o f  t h e  C e n s u s , 
C o u n ty  a n d  C i t y  D a ta  B o o k  ( W a s h in g to n :  G o v e rn m e n t P r i n t i n g  
O f f i c e ,  1967), p. 555-
May 8, i969s s.sk, "what has it accomplished to date--really
PEaccomplished?"  ^ This is a hard question to answer, and 
this is confirmed by 0E0 officials, who in 1969 appropria­
tions hearings, asked for three million dollars to have 
a  "one-to-one" study of "what happens" to JOB CORPS 
grad.us.tes * The General Accounting Office (GAO), in its 
study of 0E0 operations, put the whole situation quite 
well holding,
, . . the methods of evaluating social programs such as 
these and the indicators of progress are not well- 
developed or understood* . . as the scope of government 
activity broadens and the complexity of programs in­
creases, the Congress is confronted with the necessity 
of appraising accomplishments^ that cannot be measured 
-■> in terms of dollars expended,27
In making this statement, GAO clarifies the issue to 
which citizens have given too little consideration; if we 
are.to engage in a social resource development •program, we 
must be more willing to accept the problems of clientele, 
efficiency and reputation with which QEO has been confronted. 
In short, we mu fit learn to "live with" the uncertainty in­
herent in the War on Poverty and, even if we were to dis­
cover that CEO operations were not "cost-effective," it 
would not detract from the moral necessity for solution of 
this diverse and urgent social problem.
^Editorial, The Richmond News-Leader* May 8, 1969•
26Hearings, Appropriations* p , 167 *
27 .Revnew of Economic Opportunity Programs, p, 2.
CHAPTER VI
A FEW FINAL WORDS
In this essay, the subject under discussion has been 
the application of a 1 rational1' resource allocation method 
to the planning end execution of a social resource 
development agency of the Federal Government.
Unfortunately, this type of budgeting, which many 
have considered superior to either the line item approach ' 
or the incremental approach, is not invulnerable. The 
claim for its accuracy in predicting benefits cannot be 
sustained, because there are practical and theoretical 
difficulties in determining the Incidence of benefit, even 
should we be able to agree on goals to be sought. This is 
particularly true in an 0E0 program where the benefits must 
have some current relevancy, but are also to be considered 
in terras of long-range effects. Recent overruns in the 
Defense Department procurement activities indicate that 
difficulties with program budgeting are widespread.
The redeeming virtue of PPBS is not that it can 
demonstrate results, but that It can help us to gain 
clarity about the problems we face. With PPBS, the un­
certainty Inherent in government programs will not go away, 
but we are forced to consider the broad goals of given
73
policies and programs and to make relevant comparisons with 
other possible courses of action. In the end, however, we 
must realize, and accept, the fact that every budget is an 
act of political faith. What we can ask is that with the 
antipoverty program, we accept the risks involved in this 
unprecedented, unique and urgently required effort. This 
will require an act of political faith on our part, for no 
system of budgeting will be able to demonstrate conclusive 
results in an area so complex and difficult as that involved 
in the elimination of poverty in America.
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INTERVIEWS
Mr. Louis Bailey, Field Representative for Richmond, Virginia, 
Office of Economic Opportunity, Interview held in 
Washington, B.C., October, 1968.
Mr, John Chiles, Assistant Director for Supportive Services, 
Richmond Community Action Program, Interview held In. 
Richmond, Virginia, November and March, 1969 <•
Mr. Joe Fleming, Fulton Bottom Center Director, Richmond
Community Action Program, Interview held in Richmond, 
Virginia, May, 1968.
Mr. Harry J. Hailey, Assistant Director of Office of Economic 
Opportunity Research, Plans, Programming and Evalua­
tion, Interview held In Washington, D.C., September 
and October 1968.
Mr. John Howley, Deputy District Director, Mid Atlantic 
Region Office of Economic Opportunity, Interview 
held in Washington, D.C., October, 1968.
Mr. Paul Royston, Assistant Administrator for Community 
Action Programs, Office of Economic Opportunity, 
Interview held in Washington, D.C., October, 1968.
Mr. Frank Rupp, Management Information Specialist, Office of 
Economic Opportunity, Interview held in Washington, 
D.C., October, 1968.
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